Why Migrate to Microsoft Entra ID?
A seamless migration from on-premises Active Directory to Microsoft Entra ID is a phased program, not a cutover. You synchronise existing identities into the cloud with Microsoft Entra Connect, choose a single resilient authentication method (Password Hash Synchronization for almost every Australian organisation), pilot with a small group, then progressively move applications and enforce Conditional Access. Done in stages, users keep the same username and password while you shift the control plane to the cloud with no big-bang switchover.
Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) provides cloud-native identity and access management with stronger security, simplified administration, and a better sign-in experience. As organisations embrace cloud and hybrid work, Entra ID enables Zero Trust, Conditional Access, and seamless integration with Microsoft 365, Azure, and SaaS applications. This guide is the migration roadmap; if you already run hybrid identity and want to test how defensible your tenant is, start with the Identity and Access Review assessment.
1) Migration Scenarios & Decision Framework
Cloud-Only vs. Hybrid Identity
The first decision is whether you need hybrid identity at all. Cloud-only means identities are created and mastered directly in Entra ID with no synchronisation from on-premises Active Directory. It is the simplest model, has no on-premises footprint to maintain, and suits organisations that have already retired their domain controllers or were born in the cloud. The trade-off is that any application or device still relying on Kerberos or NTLM domain authentication will not work without additional services.
Hybrid identity keeps Active Directory as the source of truth and synchronises users, groups, and contacts to Entra ID using Microsoft Entra Connect (formerly Azure AD Connect). Microsoft describes Entra Connect as the tool that handles "sync and sign on from Active Directories to Microsoft Entra ID" (Microsoft Learn — Directory synchronization, accessed 16 June 2026). This is the right model for any organisation mid-journey: you continue managing accounts on-premises while users gain single sign-on to cloud apps with their existing credentials. The lighter-weight Microsoft Entra Connect cloud sync (using a cloud-managed provisioning agent rather than a full Entra Connect server) is an option for smaller or multi-forest environments.
When to Choose Each Model
| Scenario | Recommended Model |
|---|---|
| 100% cloud applications, no on-prem servers | Cloud-only |
| On-prem AD with gradual cloud migration | Hybrid identity (sync) |
| Legacy apps requiring domain join in Azure | Entra Domain Services |
| Mergers or acquisitions needing trust | Hybrid + Entra External ID |
2) Pre-Migration Assessment & Planning
Assess Current State
Before touching Entra Connect, inventory what you actually have. Catalogue your Active Directory forests and domains, the user, group, and contact object counts, and any non-routable UPN suffixes (for example .local or .lan) that will not sync cleanly. Microsoft is explicit that the UPN should match the user's primary email address, "[email protected] rather than [email protected]" (Microsoft Learn — Synchronize domain users to Microsoft 365, accessed 16 June 2026).
Run the Microsoft IdFix tool to surface duplicate and malformed attributes before your first sync. Microsoft recommends using IdFix "to identify errors such as duplicates and formatting problems in your directory before you synchronize to Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft 365" (Microsoft Learn — Prerequisites for Microsoft Entra Connect, accessed 16 June 2026). The most common blockers are duplicate proxyAddresses, duplicate or blank userPrincipalName values, and invalid characters in name attributes. Also inventory your application estate: which apps use SAML, OAuth, or WS-Federation today, which rely on ADFS, and which still depend on LDAP or Kerberos. That inventory drives the application migration plan in section 5.
Clean Up On-Premises AD
# REVIEW BEFORE RUNNING. These commands change or disable directory objects.
# Each bulk action defaults to -WhatIf so nothing changes until you remove it.
# Always export and inspect the candidate lists first.
# 1) Find stale user accounts (no sign-in for 180+ days).
# Note: lastLogonTimestamp is only replicated periodically and can lag by up to
# ~14 days, so treat the result as a review list, not an exact last-logon time.
# (LastLogonDate is derived from the same attribute and is equally approximate;
# for an authoritative value, query the Entra ID sign-in logs instead.)
$InactiveDays = 180
$InactiveDate = (Get-Date).AddDays(-$InactiveDays)
$StaleUsers = Get-ADUser -Filter {Enabled -eq $true} -Properties LastLogonTimeStamp |
Where-Object {
$_.LastLogonTimeStamp -and
([DateTime]::FromFileTime($_.LastLogonTimeStamp)) -lt $InactiveDate
}
# Export and review BEFORE disabling anything:
$StaleUsers |
Select-Object Name, SamAccountName,
@{N='LastLogon';E={[DateTime]::FromFileTime($_.LastLogonTimeStamp)}} |
Export-Csv ".\StaleUsers.csv" -NoTypeInformation
# Disable only after you have reviewed the CSV. Remove -WhatIf to apply.
$StaleUsers | Disable-ADAccount -WhatIf
# 2) Identify empty groups, EXCLUDING built-in and critical groups.
$ProtectedGroups = @(
"Domain Admins","Enterprise Admins","Schema Admins","Administrators",
"Domain Users","Domain Computers","Domain Controllers","Group Policy Creator Owners",
"Account Operators","Backup Operators","Server Operators","Print Operators",
"Read-only Domain Controllers","Protected Users","Cert Publishers","DnsAdmins"
)
$EmptyGroups = Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties Members, GroupCategory, isCriticalSystemObject |
Where-Object {
$_.Members.Count -eq 0 -and
-not $_.isCriticalSystemObject -and
$ProtectedGroups -notcontains $_.Name
}
# REVIEW the list before removing. Remove objects only after confirming each one.
# -WhatIf and -Confirm are on by default -- remove -WhatIf to apply.
$EmptyGroups | Select-Object Name, GroupCategory, DistinguishedName | Format-Table -AutoSize
# $EmptyGroups | Remove-ADGroup -WhatIf -Confirm
# 3) Report duplicate UPNs and email addresses (read-only).
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties UserPrincipalName, EmailAddress |
Group-Object UserPrincipalName | Where-Object {$_.Count -gt 1}
Plan Identity Architecture
With a clean directory, design the target architecture. Verify the custom domain you intend to use in Entra ID first; verifying a domain also raises the default tenant object limit from 50,000 to 300,000 (Microsoft Learn — Prerequisites for Microsoft Entra Connect, accessed 16 June 2026). Decide your synchronisation scope by organisational unit so that service accounts, test objects, and disabled accounts are excluded. Plan device posture early: Microsoft Entra hybrid join or Microsoft Entra join determines whether users get seamless single sign-on from corporate devices.
Resilience is an architecture decision, not an afterthought. Deploy a second Entra Connect server in staging mode for disaster recovery so that a failed primary does not stop synchronisation. Create at least one cloud-only Hybrid Identity Administrator (and break-glass Global Administrator) account so an on-premises outage cannot lock you out of the tenant. Finally, decide on licensing: Conditional Access requires Microsoft Entra ID P1, and Identity Protection sign-in risk policies plus Privileged Identity Management require Entra ID P2.
3) Authentication Strategy
Password Hash Synchronization (PHS) - Recommended
Password Hash Synchronization is the recommended method for almost every Australian organisation. A salted hash of the on-premises password hash is synchronised to Entra ID, and Microsoft validates credentials in the cloud with no dependency on on-premises infrastructure at sign-in time. Microsoft calls it "the simplest way to enable authentication for on-premises directory objects in Microsoft Entra ID" (Microsoft Learn — Choose the right authentication method, accessed 16 June 2026).
Two further reasons make PHS the default. First, resilience: Microsoft observed that organisations which had enabled PHS as a backup "changed their primary authentication method to then use password hash synchronization. They were back online in a matter of hours" after ransomware took down on-premises servers, while those without it took weeks to recover (Microsoft Learn — Choose the right authentication method, accessed 16 June 2026). Second, threat detection: PHS is a prerequisite for the leaked-credentials detection in Microsoft Entra ID Protection, which checks your identities against credential lists harvested from the dark web. Even if you choose PTA or federation as the primary method, Microsoft recommends enabling PHS as a backup.
Pass-Through Authentication (PTA)
Pass-Through Authentication validates passwords directly against on-premises Active Directory using lightweight software agents, so no password hashes are stored in the cloud. Microsoft positions it for "companies with a security requirement to immediately enforce on-premises user account states, password policies, and sign-in hours" (Microsoft Learn — Choose the right authentication method, accessed 16 June 2026). Choose PTA only when a documented regulatory requirement prevents password hashes synchronising to the cloud.
The cost is on-premises dependency. PTA relies on the agents and the domain controllers behind them being available, so Microsoft recommends deploying "two extra pass-through authentication agents" in addition to the one on the Entra Connect server for high availability. Note that failover to PHS is not automatic; you must switch the sign-in method manually in Entra Connect, which is one more reason to keep PHS enabled as a backup.
Federated Authentication (ADFS)
Federated authentication with Active Directory Federation Services keeps authentication entirely on-premises and is the only one of the three methods that supports smart card authentication and third-party or on-premises MFA that relies on federation (Microsoft Learn — Hybrid scenarios, accessed 16 June 2026). It is the right choice almost exclusively for organisations with an existing federation investment and a hard requirement for one of those capabilities.
The trade-offs are significant: ADFS requires two or more federation servers plus two or more Web Application Proxy servers in a perimeter network, TLS certificates, inbound internet access, and network load balancing. Microsoft notes federation "is more complex to operate and troubleshoot compared to cloud authentication solutions" (Microsoft Learn — Choose the right authentication method, accessed 16 June 2026). For most organisations, Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication now removes the historical reason to keep ADFS, letting you retire the federation farm while still meeting phishing-resistant MFA requirements.
Recommendation Flowchart
- Do you require smart card authentication? → If yes, use ADFS (with PHS backup)
- Do you have compliance requirements preventing password hashes in cloud? → If yes, use PTA
- All other scenarios → Use PHS (simplest, most resilient)
4) Implementation Steps (Hybrid Identity)
Phase 1: Prepare (Weeks 1-2)
- Verify domain: Add and verify your domain in Entra ID using DNS TXT or MX record.
- Install Azure AD Connect:
# Download and install Azure AD Connect $SetupFile = "C:\\Temp\\AzureADConnect.msi" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://aka.ms/AADConnect" -OutFile $SetupFile Start-Process -FilePath $SetupFile -Wait # Run initial configuration wizard # - Select "Express Settings" for standard deployments # - Choose PHS as authentication method # - Configure sync filtering by OU - Configure filtering: Exclude unnecessary OUs, service accounts, and test accounts from sync.
- Enable Password Hash Sync: Even if using PTA/ADFS, enable PHS as resilience backup.
Phase 2: Pilot Sync (Weeks 3-4)
- Sync pilot OU: Start with small group (20-50 users) for testing.
- Validate sync: Verify users appear in Entra ID with correct attributes (DisplayName, UPN, Email, Group membership).
- Test authentication: Users sign into Microsoft 365, Azure portal, and SaaS apps.
- Monitor sync health: Use Azure AD Connect Health to track sync errors and latency.
Phase 3: Enable Security Features (Weeks 5-6)
- Enable Conditional Access (baseline): Require MFA for all users and block legacy authentication, which bypasses MFA and is the most common credential-stuffing vector. Conditional Access requires Microsoft Entra ID P1.
- Turn on sign-in risk policies: With Entra ID P2, use Microsoft Entra ID Protection to block high sign-in risk and require MFA on medium risk; the leaked-credentials report depends on PHS being enabled.
- Deploy Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR): Enrol the pilot group so users can reset their own passwords, reducing helpdesk load during broad rollout. Combine with password writeback so resets flow back to on-premises AD.
- Require device compliance for sensitive apps: Apply the Conditional Access grant control to require a compliant or hybrid-joined device for SharePoint, Exchange, and finance line-of-business apps.
- Keep new policies in report-only first: Validate impact in sign-in logs for a few days before enforcing, so you catch service accounts and edge cases before they cause lockouts.
Phase 4: Broad Rollout (Weeks 7-10)
- Expand sync scope: Add remaining OUs in stages (100 → 500 → all users).
- User communication: Notify users of sign-in changes, SSPR enrolment, and MFA requirements.
- Application migration: Reconfigure SaaS apps and line-of-business apps to use Entra ID (SAML, OAuth, WS-Fed).
- Monitor and optimise: Track sign-in logs, MFA adoption, and sync errors; tune policies based on feedback.
5) Application Migration Strategies
SaaS Applications
Start application migration with the simplest, highest-value SaaS apps. Microsoft advises keeping the first wave simple, favouring "SaaS apps in the gallery that support multiple identity provider (IdP) connections" with test instances and simple claim rules (Microsoft Learn — Best practices to migrate applications and authentication, accessed 16 June 2026). The Microsoft Entra application gallery has pre-integrated tutorials for thousands of SaaS apps. For each one, add the gallery app under Enterprise applications, configure SAML or OpenID Connect single sign-on, map the required claims, and assign users by group.
Where an app supports multiple identity providers simultaneously, add Entra ID as an additional IdP, validate sign-in with a test user, then switch Entra ID to the primary IdP and remove the legacy provider. This staged cutover gives you a clean rollback path. Modern protocols (OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect) are always preferable to legacy SAML or WS-Federation where the app supports them.
On-Premises Applications
For internal web apps that cannot move to the cloud, Microsoft Entra application proxy publishes them for secure remote access without a VPN or inbound firewall ports. Microsoft describes it as providing "secure remote access to on-premises web applications for remote users" after single sign-on to Entra ID (Microsoft Learn — Microsoft Entra application proxy, accessed 16 June 2026). A lightweight private network connector runs on a Windows server and makes only outbound connections, so there is no perimeter network to maintain.
The security benefit is significant: with Entra ID pre-authentication, only authenticated identities reach the back-end application, and you can layer Conditional Access and MFA on top. Application proxy requires Entra ID P1 or P2 and a synchronised identity set so users can be pre-authenticated. It replaces VPN and reverse-proxy patterns for remote access to apps such as on-premises SharePoint and internal line-of-business portals.
Legacy LDAP/Kerberos Applications
The hardest category is applications that authenticate against domain controllers using LDAP or Kerberos and cannot be re-coded for modern protocols. For these, Microsoft Entra Domain Services provides a managed domain in Azure (with Kerberos, NTLM, LDAP, and Group Policy) that requires no domain controllers to manage and depends on PHS being enabled. Lift-and-shift such apps into Azure virtual machines joined to the managed domain.
For web apps that use header-based or Kerberos-constrained-delegation authentication, application proxy with single sign-on can broker access while still applying Conditional Access. The strategic goal, however, is to retire legacy authentication: every app left on LDAP or Kerberos is an app that cannot benefit from MFA, Conditional Access, or risk-based policies. Treat these as modernisation candidates, not permanent fixtures, and feed them into your identity and access review cycle so they stay visible.
6) Security & Governance Post-Migration
Implement Zero Trust
# Conditional Access policy: Block legacy authentication
$Policy = @{
DisplayName = "Block Legacy Authentication"
State = "Enabled"
Conditions = @{
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = "All" }
ClientAppTypes = @("exchangeActiveSync", "other")
}
GrantControls = @{ BuiltInControls = @("Block") }
}
New-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -BodyParameter $Policy
Privileged Identity Management
Once identities are in the cloud, the highest-impact control is removing standing administrative access. Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management "provides time-based and approval-based role activation to mitigate the risks of excessive, unnecessary, or misused access permissions" (Microsoft Learn — Privileged Identity Management, accessed 16 June 2026). Make every privileged role (Global Administrator, Exchange Administrator, SharePoint Administrator, and so on) eligible-not-active, so administrators activate just-in-time with approval and justification.
This is also an Australian compliance requirement. The ACSC Essential Eight control Restrict Administrative Privileges expects, at Maturity Level 2, that "privileged access to systems, applications and data repositories is requested on demand for a limited time, requires approval, and is logged" (cyber.gov.au — Essential Eight Maturity Model, accessed 16 June 2026). Keep permanent Global Administrators below five, stand up two cloud-only break-glass accounts excluded from Conditional Access, and require privileged work from a separate, hardened workstation. PIM requires Entra ID P2.
Continuous Monitoring
Migration does not end at cutover; the cloud control plane needs ongoing assurance. Stream Entra ID sign-in and audit logs to a SIEM or Log Analytics workspace and alert on risky sign-ins, legacy-authentication attempts, and privileged-role activations. Use Microsoft Entra Connect Health to track synchronisation latency and errors, and review the Identity Secure Score in the Entra admin centre as a trend indicator against Microsoft best practice.
Schedule recurring access reviews for privileged roles and guest accounts (quarterly is a reasonable baseline) so entitlements do not drift. Configuration drift is the silent failure mode of identity programs, so treat the post-migration tenant as something you audit on a cadence rather than set and forget. Our companion guide on auditing Entra ID for the Australian Privacy Act sets out a three-pillar audit framework you can run quarterly.
7) Common Pitfalls & Solutions
| Pitfall | Consequence | Solution |
|---|---|---|
| Non-routable UPN suffix (.local) | Users cannot sign in with their email; sync fails | Add a routable UPN suffix in AD and update users before first sync |
| Skipping IdFix | Duplicate proxyAddresses and blank UPNs block synchronisation | Run IdFix and remediate every error before installing Entra Connect |
| No PHS backup with PTA or ADFS | On-premises outage locks users out of cloud apps | Enable PHS as a resilience backup regardless of primary method |
| Single Entra Connect server | Sync stops if the server fails | Deploy a second server in staging mode for disaster recovery |
| Enforcing Conditional Access without report-only | Service accounts and edge cases locked out at rollout | Pilot every new policy in report-only, then enforce |
| No cloud-only break-glass account | Tenant lockout during an on-premises outage | Create two excluded cloud-only emergency accounts and monitor them |
| Leaving legacy authentication enabled | MFA is bypassed; credential stuffing succeeds | Block legacy authentication tenant-wide in Conditional Access |
Before / After
Before: On-prem AD only, VPN required for remote access, no conditional access, ADFS for federation, manual password resets.
After: Hybrid identity with PHS, Conditional Access enforced, Zero Trust architecture, Seamless SSO, Self-Service Password Reset, Application Proxy for remote access.
Australian Context
For Australian organisations, an Entra ID migration is also a privacy and compliance program. Every personal information record in Microsoft 365 is gated by an Entra ID token, so identity misconfiguration becomes a regulator-facing risk under the Privacy Act 1988 and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme administered by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. The OAIC states that the NDB scheme "requires organisations covered by the Privacy Act to notify any individuals likely to be at risk of serious harm by a data breach" (oaic.gov.au — Notifiable Data Breaches, accessed 16 June 2026). A compromised Global Administrator or a missing MFA policy is one of the most common precursors to an eligible breach.
Align the migration to the ACSC Essential Eight while you build it. Multi-factor authentication and Restrict Administrative Privileges are two of the eight mitigation strategies, and Entra ID delivers both directly through Conditional Access and PIM. The Essential Eight Maturity Model at cyber.gov.au gives you the maturity-level language to put in your migration business case, and ties the technical work back to obligations your board already understands.
Evidence to Collect
Keep an evidence pack so the migration is defensible to an internal auditor or an OAIC enquiry:
- Authentication method decision with the rationale (PHS as primary, PHS-as-backup if PTA or ADFS).
- IdFix remediation report showing the directory was clean before first sync.
- Conditional Access policy export confirming MFA enforced, legacy authentication blocked, and device compliance required for sensitive apps.
- PIM configuration showing privileged roles are eligible-not-active, with the Global Administrator count below five and break-glass accounts documented.
- Entra Connect Health screenshots evidencing sync health and the staging-mode disaster-recovery server.
- Application migration register mapping each app to its protocol, IdP, and migration status.
- Access review records for privileged roles and guests on a quarterly cadence.
Call to Action
Modernise your identity infrastructure with Entra ID to enable Zero Trust, improve security, and simplify administration. Start with a pilot, prove value, then expand to your entire organisation.
CTA: Book an identity modernisation assessment to build your Entra ID migration roadmap.
Sources referenced in this article: Microsoft Learn — Choose the right authentication method for your Microsoft Entra hybrid identity solution, Hybrid scenarios, Prerequisites for Microsoft Entra Connect, Directory synchronization, Synchronize domain users to Microsoft 365, Best practices to migrate applications and authentication to Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft Entra application proxy, and Privileged Identity Management (all accessed 16 June 2026). ACSC Essential Eight Maturity Model (cyber.gov.au, accessed 16 June 2026). OAIC Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (oaic.gov.au, accessed 16 June 2026).


