Why Active Directory is a Prime Target
Active Directory (AD) controls authentication and authorisation across your entire Windows environment. A compromise of AD grants attackers the "keys to the kingdom"—enabling lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistent access. With the vast majority of large enterprises using AD, it remains a primary target for advanced persistent threats and ransomware campaigns.
1) Understanding AD Attack Vectors
- Kerberos attacks: Golden tickets, silver tickets, Kerberoasting, and AS-REP roasting exploit weak Kerberos configurations.
- Pass-the-hash/Pass-the-ticket: Attackers reuse NTLM hashes or Kerberos tickets for lateral movement.
- DCSync attacks: Malicious replication requests extract password hashes from domain controllers.
- GPO abuse: Attackers modify Group Policy for persistence, privilege escalation, or malware deployment.
- NTLM relay: Man-in-the-middle attacks relay NTLM authentication to compromise systems.
2) Tier 0 Protection (Domain Controllers & Admin Accounts)
Secure Domain Controllers
- Physical & virtual security: Isolate DCs on dedicated VLAN; restrict console access; enable BitLocker.
- Patch rigorously: Apply security updates within 48 hours; test in pre-prod first.
- Audit logging: Enable advanced audit policies for authentication, directory changes, and policy modifications.
- Network segmentation: Firewall DCs from workstations; allow only required ports (53, 88, 389, 636, 3268, 3269).
- No internet access: DCs should never access the internet directly; route through controlled proxies if absolutely necessary.
Privileged Account Management
- Eliminate standing admin rights: Remove users from Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins except for emergency break-glass accounts.
- Implement Just-In-Time (JIT): Use Azure AD PIM or third-party PAM for time-bound admin access with approval workflows.
- Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs): Dedicated, hardened devices for administrative tasks—never browse internet or check email on PAWs.
- Separate admin accounts: Admins use different accounts for administrative vs. day-to-day tasks; never elevate privileges on untrusted devices.
- Strong passwords + MFA: Enforce 25+ character passwords for privileged accounts; require phishing-resistant MFA.
3) Hardening Configurations
Disable Insecure Protocols
# Disable SMBv1 (vulnerable to EternalBlue and ransomware)
Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false -Force
# Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS (prevent NTLM relay)
New-GPO -Name "Disable LLMNR" | New-GPLink -Target "DC=contoso,DC=com"
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name "Disable LLMNR" -Key "HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient" -ValueName "EnableMulticast" -Type DWord -Value 0
# Disable WPAD (prevent NTLM relay)
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name "Disable LLMNR" -Key "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Wpad" -ValueName "WpadOverride" -Type DWord -Value 1
Enforce LDAP Signing & Channel Binding
# Require LDAP signing
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name "LDAP Signing" -Key "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\Parameters" -ValueName "LDAPServerIntegrity" -Type DWord -Value 2
# Enable LDAP channel binding
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name "LDAP Signing" -Key "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\Parameters" -ValueName "LdapEnforceChannelBinding" -Type DWord -Value 2
Harden Kerberos
- Disable RC4 encryption: Configure GPO to remove RC4 from supported encryption types (use AES128/AES256 only).
- Service Principal Name (SPN) auditing: Monitor for new SPNs to detect Kerberoasting attempts.
- Set short ticket lifetimes: Reduce TGT lifetime from 10 hours to 4 hours for privileged accounts.
- Enable PAC validation: Enforce Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) verification to prevent ticket forgery.
4) Group Policy Object (GPO) Security
Protect GPOs from Tampering
- Delegate carefully: Limit GPO editing rights to designated admins; audit membership of Group Policy Creator Owners.
- GPO versioning: Backup GPOs before changes; maintain change log with justifications.
- Enable WMI filtering: Scope GPOs precisely to target OUs; avoid broad "linked to domain root" policies.
- Deny "Apply Group Policy": For sensitive GPOs, explicitly deny application to untrusted groups.
Security Baselines via GPO
# Import Microsoft Security Baseline GPOs
# Download from https://aka.ms/securitybaselines
$BaselinePath = "C:\\SecurityBaselines\\Windows11-v2311"
Import-GPO -BackupGpoName "MSFT Windows 11 - Computer" -Path $BaselinePath -TargetName "Windows 11 Security Baseline" -CreateIfNeeded
# Link to appropriate OUs
New-GPLink -Name "Windows 11 Security Baseline" -Target "OU=Workstations,DC=contoso,DC=com" -LinkEnabled Yes
5) Monitoring & Threat Detection
Enable Advanced Audit Policies
# Audit privilege use
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Sensitive Privilege Use" /success:enable /failure:enable
# Audit directory service changes
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Changes" /success:enable /failure:enable
# Audit account management
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"User Account Management" /success:enable /failure:enable
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Security Group Management" /success:enable /failure:enable
# Audit logon events
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable
Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Special Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable
Key Events to Monitor
- Event 4624: Successful logon (Type 10 = RDP, Type 3 = Network, Type 2 = Interactive)
- Event 4625: Failed logon attempts (potential brute force or password spray)
- Event 4720: User account created (potential persistence mechanism)
- Event 4728/4732: User added to security-enabled group (privilege escalation)
- Event 4768/4769: Kerberos TGT/TGS requests (Kerberoasting detection)
- Event 4662: Directory service object accessed (DCSync detection)
- Event 5136: Directory service object modified (GPO tampering, AdminSDHolder changes)
Deploy Microsoft Defender for Identity
- Installation: Deploy sensors on all DCs; configure port mirroring for read-only DCs.
- Detections: Identifies Golden Ticket, DCSync, Pass-the-Hash, reconnaissance, and lateral movement.
- Integration: Feeds alerts to Microsoft Sentinel or third-party SIEM for correlation.
- Automated response: Configure playbooks to disable compromised accounts or isolate devices.
6) Implementation Roadmap (6 Months)
Phase 1: Assessment (Month 1)
- Inventory privileged accounts, service accounts, and admin group membership
- Run PingCastle or Purple Knight for AD security assessment
- Identify insecure protocols (SMBv1, LLMNR, NTLM) and legacy applications requiring them
- Document current GPO structure and ownership
Phase 2: Quick Wins (Months 2-3)
- Remove users from privileged groups; implement JIT access
- Deploy PAWs for Tier 0 admins
- Disable SMBv1 on all devices except documented dependencies
- Enable LDAP signing and channel binding
- Implement advanced audit policies and ship logs to SIEM
Phase 3: Hardening (Months 4-5)
- Deploy Microsoft Security Baselines via GPO
- Harden Kerberos (disable RC4, reduce ticket lifetimes)
- Implement Credential Guard and Remote Credential Guard
- Deploy Microsoft Defender for Identity sensors
- Configure LAPS for local admin password management
Phase 4: Validation (Month 6)
- Run purple team exercises simulating AD attacks
- Validate detection and response for Golden Ticket, DCSync, Kerberoasting
- Test PAW controls and JIT workflows
- Conduct privileged account access reviews
7) Common Pitfalls & Solutions
- Legacy app dependencies: SMBv1 and NTLM can't always be disabled immediately; use port scans and logs to identify dependencies before blocking.
- Service account sprawl: Stale service accounts with elevated privileges; audit regularly and use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs).
- Over-privileged groups: "Account Operators" and "Server Operators" often have unnecessary members; review and reduce.
- AdminSDHolder drift: Protected group membership not properly managed; reconcile AdminSDHolder every 60 days.
- GPO conflicts: Multiple GPOs with conflicting settings cause unpredictable behaviour; use GPO modeling and RSoP before deployment.
Before / After
Before: Standing Domain Admin accounts, SMBv1 enabled, no LDAP signing, NTLM allowed everywhere, minimal logging.
After: JIT admin access with PAWs, SMBv1 disabled, LDAP signing enforced, Kerberos-only, comprehensive audit logging and threat detection.
Australian Context
- ACSC Essential Eight (Australian Cyber Security Centre — Essential Eight maturity model, accessed 16 June 2026): AD hardening supports Controls 5 (Restrict Admin Privileges), 2 (Patch Applications), 6 (Patch OS), and 7 (MFA).
- ISM controls (Australian Signals Directorate — Information Security Manual, accessed 16 June 2026): Aligns with authentication hardening, privileged access management, and audit logging requirements.
- Government contractors: Evidence of AD hardening (config exports, audit logs, privileged access reviews) required for tender responses.
Evidence to Collect
- PingCastle/Purple Knight assessment reports with remediation tracking
- Privileged group membership exports and access review logs
- GPO backup exports and change management records
- Advanced audit policy configurations and SIEM integration proof
- Defender for Identity deployment status and detection examples
Call to Action
Start with privileged access management and protocol hardening, then layer in monitoring and automation. AD security is foundational to your entire Microsoft security posture.
CTA: Book an Active Directory security assessment to identify vulnerabilities and create a remediation roadmap.
Sources referenced in this article: ACSC Essential Eight, ACSC Information Security Manual (ISM), PingCastle, Purple Knight, Microsoft Security Baselines.


