An Essential Eight gap analysis tells you precisely which controls are absent, partially implemented, or inconsistently applied across your environment — so you fix problems before an auditor finds them for you.
This checklist is structured around the ACSC's 2025 Essential Eight Maturity Model update (current as of mid-2026) and is calibrated to distinguish ML1 from ML2 requirements. Work through it strategy by strategy, assign a status to each item, and use the output to build a remediation plan with owners and target dates.
Before you begin, take our free online Essential Eight assessment to get a rapid baseline that you can then validate in depth using this checklist.
How to Use This Checklist
For each item, assign one of four statuses:
- Implemented — the control is in place, enforced, and objectively verifiable
- Partial — the control exists but is not applied consistently or completely across all in-scope systems
- Not implemented — the control is absent
- Not applicable — document your rationale; auditors will scrutinise N/A claims
Record your status, the evidence that supports it, and the name of the person who verified it. A checklist with no supporting evidence is a self-assessment; a checklist with supporting evidence is the start of your audit-ready pack. For guidance on building the full pack, see the Essential Eight ML2 evidence pack pillar guide.
Strategy 1: Application Control
Application control prevents unapproved or malicious programs from executing on workstations and servers.
ML1 requirements:
- Application control is implemented on all workstations to restrict the execution of executables, software libraries, scripts, and installers to an approved set
ML2 additional requirements:
- Application control is implemented on all servers
- Allowed and blocked execution events are logged
- Logs are retained and reviewed
Checklist items:
- Is application control software deployed on all workstations — including non-SOE devices in scope?
- Is application control software deployed on all servers — including cloud-hosted virtual machines?
- Does the control cover all execution types: executables (.exe), software libraries (.dll), scripts (.ps1, .vbs, .bat), and installers (.msi)?
- Are allowed and denied execution events logged centrally?
- Are logs retained for a minimum period consistent with your log retention policy?
- Has the application control ruleset been reviewed in the past twelve months?
- Are exceptions to the application control policy documented and formally approved?
Common gaps: Server-side coverage is frequently missing. Organisations implement AppLocker or Intune Application Control on workstations but exempt servers due to operational concerns. This is a direct ML2 gap.
Strategy 2: Patch Applications
Unpatched third-party applications remain the most exploited entry point in Australian incidents.
ML1 requirements:
- Patches or updates for internet-facing services are applied within two weeks of release
ML2 additional requirements:
- Patches for internet-facing services applied within 48 hours when an exploit exists
- Patches for non-internet-facing applications applied within two weeks
- Patches for applications rated critical or high applied within two weeks regardless of internet exposure
- Applications with no vendor support are removed or isolated
Checklist items:
- Do you maintain an inventory of all applications installed across in-scope systems?
- Are vulnerability scan outputs reviewed against this inventory to identify unpatched applications?
- Is there a process to identify when a patch is released for an internet-facing service?
- Can you demonstrate that internet-facing service patches are applied within 48 hours when an exploit is publicly known?
- Can you demonstrate that all other critical and high-rated patches are applied within two weeks?
- Are any applications running past end-of-life or unsupported versions? If so, are they isolated from internet access?
- Does your vulnerability scanner cover all in-scope systems, including cloud workloads?
Common gaps: The 48-hour patching window for exploited internet-facing vulnerabilities catches most organisations out. Many have a two-week SLA and no process to accelerate when an exploit is published.
Strategy 3: Configure Microsoft Office Macro Settings
Malicious macros remain a primary delivery mechanism for malware targeting Australian businesses.
ML1 requirements:
- Microsoft Office macros are disabled for users who do not have a demonstrated business need
ML2 additional requirements:
- Microsoft Office macros are only allowed to execute when they originate from trusted locations or are digitally signed by a trusted publisher
- Macros sourced from the internet are blocked
Checklist items:
- Is there a Group Policy or Intune policy controlling macro settings for all Office applications?
- Are macros disabled by default for users who do not require them?
- Are macros restricted to trusted locations or digitally signed publishers for users who do require them?
- Is the "Block macros from running in Office files from the internet" setting enforced via policy?
- Are exceptions to macro policy formally approved and documented?
- Has the macro policy configuration been tested to confirm it cannot be overridden by users?
Strategy 4: User Application Hardening
Hardening user-facing applications reduces the attack surface available to browser-based and script-based attacks.
ML1 requirements:
- Flash, Java, and web advertisements are blocked in web browsers
ML2 additional requirements:
- PowerShell is configured to use Constrained Language Mode or equivalent
- .NET Framework 3.5 (including 2.0 and 3.0) is disabled unless required
- Internet Explorer 11 is disabled or removed
Checklist items:
- Is Adobe Flash blocked or removed from all browsers on in-scope devices?
- Is Java blocked from running in all browsers on in-scope devices?
- Are web advertisements blocked via browser policy or a network-level control?
- Is PowerShell configured to use Constrained Language Mode on all workstations?
- Is .NET Framework 3.5 disabled on devices where it is not required for a business application?
- Is Internet Explorer 11 disabled or removed from all in-scope devices?
- Are users prevented from installing browser extensions without approval?
Strategy 5: Restrict Administrative Privileges
Privilege misuse and stolen admin credentials enable lateral movement in nearly every significant Australian incident.
ML1 requirements:
- Privileged accounts are used only for tasks that require them (no internet browsing or email on privileged accounts)
- Privileged accounts are not granted to users who do not require them
ML2 additional requirements:
- Privileged access workstations or jump servers are used for privileged tasks
- Privileged account activity is logged and reviewed
- Privileged accounts are reviewed at least annually
Checklist items:
- Do you have a current inventory of all privileged accounts across Active Directory, cloud platforms, and applications?
- Is there a formal process to request and approve privileged account creation?
- Are privileged accounts prevented from browsing the internet or accessing email?
- Are separate privileged accounts used for administrative tasks (not the user's standard account with elevated permissions)?
- Are privileged access workstations or jump servers in use for administrative activities?
- Are privileged account actions logged centrally?
- Has a privileged account review been completed in the past twelve months?
- Are there any service accounts with interactive login rights that should be converted to managed service accounts?
Common gaps: The most common gap is shared local administrator accounts with the same password across workstations. This is an ML1 issue that remains widespread.
Strategy 6: Patch Operating Systems
Operating system vulnerabilities without patches provide straightforward footholds for attackers.
ML1 requirements:
- Operating system patches are applied within one month of release
ML2 additional requirements:
- Operating system patches for internet-facing services applied within two weeks
- Operating system patches for internet-facing services with known exploits applied within 48 hours
- Unsupported operating systems are removed or isolated
Checklist items:
- Do you have a current inventory of all operating systems in your environment, including version and patch level?
- Is there a process to identify when OS patches are released and assess their severity?
- Are OS patches for internet-facing systems applied within two weeks as a standard?
- Is there a process to accelerate patching to 48 hours when an OS exploit is publicly known?
- Are any systems running unsupported operating systems (Windows Server 2012, Windows 10 21H2, etc.)?
- Are cloud infrastructure operating systems (VM base images) included in your patch scope?
- Does your WSUS, Intune, or SCCM deployment confirmation report cover all in-scope systems?
Strategy 7: Multi-Factor Authentication
MFA is the single control that has the highest impact-per-effort ratio for reducing account compromise risk.
ML1 requirements:
- MFA is used to authenticate users to internet-facing services
ML2 additional requirements:
- MFA is used for all users accessing internet-facing services
- MFA is used for all privileged users
- MFA is phishing-resistant (passkeys, certificate-based, or FIDO2 hardware keys) for privileged accounts
Checklist items:
- Is MFA enabled for all users accessing any internet-facing service — including cloud applications, email, VPN, and remote access?
- Is MFA enabled for all privileged accounts?
- Are any legacy authentication protocols (SMTP AUTH, Basic Auth, NTLM) still in use that could bypass MFA?
- For privileged accounts, is the MFA method phishing-resistant (FIDO2 hardware key, certificate-based, or passkey)?
- Is there a process to enrol new users in MFA before they gain access to internet-facing systems?
- Are MFA bypass exceptions formally approved and documented?
- Have you tested that MFA cannot be bypassed via legacy authentication protocols or conditional access policy gaps?
Common gaps: Conditional access policies that exempt certain applications, device types, or legacy protocols create coverage gaps that bypass MFA entirely. Test coverage, do not assume it.
Strategy 8: Regular Backups
Backups are the last line of defence against ransomware and are a direct ML2 audit focus area.
ML1 requirements:
- Backups of important data, software, and configuration settings are performed and retained for a minimum of three months
ML2 additional requirements:
- Backups are tested to ensure data can be restored
- Privileged access to backups is restricted to prevent tampering
- Backups are stored offline, offsite, or in a cloud storage service that is not accessible from the production environment
Checklist items:
- Is there a formal backup policy specifying what is backed up, how often, and how long backups are retained?
- Are backups performed at least daily for critical systems?
- Are backups retained for a minimum of three months?
- Are backups stored in a location not accessible from the production environment (air-gapped, offline, or separate cloud tenancy)?
- Is access to the backup infrastructure restricted to a small number of specifically designated accounts?
- Has a restore test been completed in the past twelve months, with results documented?
- Are backup completion and failure logs reviewed regularly?
- Are configuration and software environment backups (not just data) included in the backup scope?
Scoring and Prioritising Remediation
After completing the checklist, count your items by status:
- Implemented — no action required; schedule periodic re-verification
- Partial — prioritise by the strategy's risk weight; patch, MFA, and application control gaps typically carry highest risk
- Not implemented — immediate remediation planning required
Build a remediation register with the following columns for every non-implemented or partial item:
| Column | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Strategy | Which of the eight |
| Control gap | Specific item not met |
| Current state | What is in place today |
| Required state | What ML2 requires |
| Remediation action | Technical step to close the gap |
| Owner | Named individual accountable |
| Target date | Realistic completion date |
| Priority | High / Medium / Low |
Present this register to your leadership team alongside a risk summary. Leadership need to understand that ML1-to-ML2 uplift is not a cosmetic improvement — it closes specific attack vectors that threat actors actively exploit against Australian organisations.
2026 Australian Context: What Has Changed
The ACSC's 2025 maturity model update (effective for most assessments from early 2026) introduced stricter requirements in two areas:
-
Phishing-resistant MFA is now explicitly required for privileged accounts at ML2, not just ML3. Organisations still using SMS-based or authenticator app MFA for admin accounts have a gap even if they were previously assessed at ML2.
-
Application control on servers is now weighted more heavily in assessments following several high-profile ransomware cases where server-side execution of malicious scripts was the primary lateral movement technique.
If your last assessment was conducted before July 2025, re-run the checklist against the current model before treating your prior result as current.
Next Steps
A checklist identifies gaps. Closing them requires prioritised effort. If you are uncertain which gaps represent genuine operational risk versus compliance risk in your specific environment, a structured assessment provides the context a checklist alone cannot.
Use our free Essential Eight assessment to validate your checklist findings with an independent view and get a prioritised remediation roadmap tailored to your organisation size and industry.


